近期，学院徐扬教授以第一作者身份在期刊International Journal of Production Economics（2023年）上在线发表题为“Joint price and quality optimization strategy in crowdfunding campaign”的论文，以通讯作者身份在期刊Mathematical Methods in the Applied Sciences（2023年）上在线发表题为“E-platform finance versus bank finance: pricing, quality design, and competition analysis”的论文。International Journal of Production Economics和Mathematical Methods in the Applied Sciences期刊影响因素分别为12和2.9，均为学校校定A级期刊。
Abstract：This paper considers a scenario where a creator uses crowdfunding to raise funds, and after successfully implementing the project, he will further sell products in spot market. We jointly optimize price and product quality to maximize the long-term benefits of the creator. Our analysis first reveals that, beyond the financing advantage, the creator can also obtain premium in crowdfunding through price discrimination, which explains why prices of many products on Kickstarter are reduced in spot market. Second, we find over-investment happens because higher product quality can increase price discrimination level, which is affected by the capital constraint level and product attributes. Our analysis also suggests that crowdfunding increases total consumer surplus, yet this outcome results from two competing effects-the positive effect of larger market coverage and the negative effect of price discrimination. Moreover, we reveal the difference in change direction between individual consumer surplus and total consumer surplus. In extensions, we investigate how the creator can respond to consumers' strategic waiting behavior and moral hazard. We further study how the price commitment and deferred payment mechanism can improve crowdfunding performance regarding consumers' strategic behavior and moral hazard, respectively.
Abstract：Some e-platforms such as Amazon and JD.com are increasingly active in financing business, but theoretical research on this business is not comprehensive enough. This paper uses game theory model to compare the equilibrium of e-platform financing (EPF) and bank financing (BF) in terms of pricing, quality, suppliers' competition, participants' profits, and consumer welfare. We find that a monopolistic supplier can always enjoy a lower loan interest rate and borrow more loans to improve production quantity or quality under EPF, which benefits to the participants and consumers. Interestingly, the e-platform provides free loans and only profits from commission fee under some conditions. When there are two suppliers competing for the market share, the absolute advantage of EPF will change. If the supply chain or market environment is bad (production cost or commission rate is high; the potential market or initial budget is low), the e-platform will offer lower interest rates than bank to reduce the strength gap between the suppliers; thus, the capital-constrained supplier prefers EPF, which shows that the EPF business is an effective means to regulate upstream competition. However, when there are more competitive suppliers, the preferences of the suppliers with less initial capital are the same as the scenario of the two competitive suppliers, while the preference of the supplier with more initial capital is just the opposite. Finally, if the commission rate is endogenous, we demonstrate that the e-platform will offer free loans but charge a relatively high commission fee.